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        Unchecked and Unbalanced?  
The Politics and Policy of US Nuclear Launch Authority  
 
 Should the United States system of nuclear launch authority be revised to allow 
greater collective input to decision-making? Recent legislative proposals and media 
commentary have argued that US nuclear statecraft would benefit from reform of command 
and control: either a reassertion of congressional authority to approve the first-use of nuclear 
weapons or the co-participation of additional actors within the executive branch in the launch 
process. Strengthening such safeguards would, it is claimed, leave presidential command 
intact to respond to an attack on the US but guard against an out-of-control Commander-in-
Chief initiating an irrational or illegal nuclear war. If the unthinkable had to occur, the 
president would no longer be unchecked and unbalanced. 
The current centralized system is a glaring exception to the US Constitution’s intricate 
order of fragmented authority and multiple veto points. No more striking a contrast to the 
Framers’ suspicion of concentrated power exists. But this article argues that profound caution 
should nonetheless accompany consideration of legislative changes whose constitutionality is 
heavily contested and strategic value is at best unclear. At a moment of extraordinary partisan 
polarization at home and deepening geo-political tension in the poly-nuclear order abroad, 
injecting greater procedural uncertainty into the decision-making process seems as 
strategically unwise as it is politically untimely. If reform should occur to address the 
inherent risks in unfettered presidential discretion, alterations involving Congress represent 
the worst options. Requiring intra-executive concurrence in launch decisions offers more 
modest but important improvements on the existing design. 
In balancing strategic necessity, constitutional authority, military efficiency and 
legislative oversight, the unique properties of nuclear weapons caution strongly against 
heavily constraining presidential autonomy over launch decisions. The US is a nation of laws, 
but it is first a nation. As such, the relative merits of presidential decision-making for the 
nation’s safety are a concern of constitutional dignity rather than a concern to be weighed 
against the Constitution. But even if constitutional objections to legislative control are not 
dispositive, and the argument rests primarily on its policy merits, serious problems confront 
Congress exercising co-responsibility for nuclear decisions. There exist no means that are 
both constitutional and practical by which Congress can feasibly share first-use decisions 
with the president. 
That, however, leaves the status quo in tension with core constitutional values. In 
rejecting monarchical models, the Framers rejected the notion that a single individual should 
possess exclusive authority to initiate war.1 Executive concurrence would instead provide 
serious but not intrusive checks, leaving presidential authority intact and preserving the 
credibility of US deterrence while protecting the military from evaluating the legality of 
launch orders. The governance of nuclear weapons would benefit from such an important, if 
                                                          
1 An exception to the broad consensus on this point is John Yoo, The Powers of War and 
Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs After 9/11 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005). 
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modest, reform that applies the spirit of the Constitution and limited government to the 
ultimate presidential power. 
In making this case, the article revisits and updates discussion of launch authority. An 
otherwise voluminous literature on war powers devotes minimal attention to the topic, while 
the most recent scholarship on first-use dates from the 1980s.2 Even the National War Powers 
Commission report of 2008 – chaired by James Baker and Warren Christopher – did not 
mention nuclear war or weapons in seventy-two pages of analysis and recommendations.3 
The discussion here proceeds from three assumptions: first, global nuclear disarmament is not 
a serious medium term prospect; second, the potential for limited nuclear war – especially, 
adversary nuclear escalation during a conventional conflict - represents a serious challenge to 
the US4; and third, pressure to curb presidential discretion is likely to remain part of an 
increasingly polarized foreign and national security policy-making environment, especially in 
conditions of divided government where a Republican White House faces a Democratic 
House and/or Senate.  
Four options for organizing launch authority have generated support: 
i. Prohibition. Congress passes legislation prohibiting outright the first use of 
nuclear weapons as US policy. 
ii. Conditionality. Congress passes legislation mandating prior legislative 
authorization for the offensive use of nuclear weapons. 
iii. Unilateralism. The president remains empowered to use nuclear weapons as 
he judges necessary. 
iv. Concurrence. The president is required to obtain concurrent authorization 
within the executive branch to deploy nuclear weapons. 
Although each poses serious strategic, constitutional, legal and political dilemmas, option (iv) 
is least problematic. After briefly reviewing US launch authority and the constitutional 
context, each option is considered in turn. 
 
Presidents, the Bomb and Launch Authority  
A comparative continuum of nuclear decision-making authority exists, ranging from the 
highly centralized to the collective.5 The US inhabits one extreme: the president has the sole 
                                                          
2 Peter Raven-Hansen (ed.), First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Under the Constitution, Who 
Decides? (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987). 
3 National War Powers Commission Report (Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of 
Virginia, 2008) http://web1.millercenter.org/reports/warpowers/report.pdf  
4 Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner (eds.), On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st 
Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014). 
5 Eryn MacDonald, “Whose Finger Is on the Button? Nuclear Launch Authority in the United 
States and Other Nations,” Union of Concerned Scientists Issue Brief, October 30, 2017; 
Avner Cohen and Brandon Mok, “Nuclear Governance and Legislation in Four Nuclear-
Armed Democracies: A Comparative Study,” 2017, Middlebury Institute for International 
Studies at Monterey http://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/nuclear-
governance-and-legislation-in-four-nuclear-armed-democracies.pdf accessed August 8, 2018. 
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legal authority to order the use of nuclear weapons, for any reason and at any time.6 The UK, 
France and North Korea also have highly centralized systems. China, Israel, India, and 
Pakistan have adopted more collective forms of decision-making. Russia seems to exist 
midway between these positions, though identifying who exactly has authority is difficult. In 
principle, then, there exist alternatives to the current US system. Integral to any judgement 
about the merits of change, however, are the constitutional context and strategic environment 
that future US decision-makers are likely to face. Any alteration to launch authority 
implicates not only legal and constitutional but strategic and tactical issues that cannot easily 
be disentangled. 
To critics, this ultimate presidential power is the most extreme example of a trend of 
congressional acquiescence and judicial sanction expanding the national security state beyond 
constitutional boundaries.7 Since Donald Trump’s election as 45th president, concern about 
this awesome responsibility has increased, especially – though not exclusively – among 
Democrats. Legislation introduced in the 115th Congress (2017-19) by Senator Edward 
Markey (D-MA) and Representative Ted Lieu (D-CA) sought to restrict presidential authority 
to order a “first-use nuclear strike” by making this subject to a prior declaration of war that 
specifically authorized the deployment. In November 2017, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, chaired by Bob Corker (R-TN), held the first hearings on launch authority by 
Congress since 1976. Op-eds also echoed the warning of former Defense Secretary, William 
Perry, that “a decision that momentous for all of civilization should have the kinds of checks 
and balances on Executive powers called for by our Constitution.”8  
Historic concern over missing checks and balances has been episodic, associated with 
periods of heightened international tensions or presidents perceived as bellicose. In 1972, 
Senator William Fulbright (D-AK) proposed an amendment to the pending War Powers 
Resolution (WPR) – rejected by 68-10 - that would have prohibited the president from 
ordering first-use of nuclear weapons without prior congressional approval or a declaration of 
war. During Ronald Reagan’s presidency (1981-1989), legal and scientific authorities 
deemed offensive nuclear war illegal or unconstitutional.9 The most recent legislation is 
notable in winning greater congressional support – the Markey-Lieu bill attracted 81 co-
sponsors in the House (80 Democrats, one Republican) and thirteen in the Senate (12 
Democrats, one Independent) – and approval from former public officials, the New York 
Times editorial board and non-proliferation advocacy groups.  
While details of the launch process are classified, it allows rapid deployment.10 The 
president is accompanied by a military officer carrying the “football,” a satchel containing 
multiple strike options and relevant codes for communicating with the chain of command to 
                                                          
6 The technical process for the launch of nuclear weapons is detailed in Amy F. Woolf, 
Defense Primer: Command and Control of Nuclear Forces CRS in Focus IF10521, 
December 1, 2016. 
7 Louis Fisher, Supreme Court Expansion of Presidential Power: Unconstitutional Leanings 
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2017); Garry Wills, Bomb Power: The Modern 
Presidency and The National Security State (New York: Penguin Books, 2010). 
8 https://lieu.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/congressman-lieu-senator-markey-
introduce-restricting-first-use-0 
9 Raven-Hansen, ibid. 
10 Woolf, ibid. 
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confirm an authentic order. Prior to issuing the order, the president is expected but not 
required to confer in person or over a secure line with senior military and civilian advisers. 
Neither the Defense Secretary nor Attorney General has a formal role in authorization and 
can be bypassed. Neither they nor Congress may overrule a launch decision. Once issued, an 
order reaches officers at the missile silos, bombers and submarines responsible for executing 
an attack. While executing a launch requires at least two military officers, the order is the 
responsibility of one individual alone. As Vice-President Cheney stated: 
The President of the United States now for fifty years is followed at all times, twenty-
four hours a day, by a military aid carrying a football that contains the nuclear codes 
that he would use, and be authorized to use, in an event of a nuclear attack on the 
United States. He could launch the kind of devastating attack the world has never 
seen. He doesn’t have to check with anybody, he doesn’t have to call Congress, he 
doesn’t have to check with the courts.11  
Ambiguity surrounds the resolution of two key aspects in tension: first, military officials are 
obligated to refuse to obey an illegal order; and second, if anyone in the chain of command 
obstructs a nuclear launch order, the president can fire them (the extent of pre-delegation also 
remains unclear12). 
The necessity for presidents to consider preventive or pre-emptive actions was opened 
by the nuclear age:  
No longer could a president easily argue, as had Franklin D. Roosevelt on the 
morning of December 7 after seeing diplomatic cables suggesting an imminent 
Japanese attack, that the United States as a peace-loving country could not attack 
Japan but would have to await an attack.”13  
The evolution of war making decisions, unique features of nuclear weapons, and their 
strategic role in deterrence of nuclear and conventional war during the Cold War pushed 
Congress to the margins to produce this extraordinary concentration of decision-making 
power.  
 
Nuclear War Powers: Who Chooses Whose Weapons, and When? 
Even as Congress has ebbed and flowed in terms of its assertiveness on national security 
policy, it has mostly left nuclear strategy to the executive branch. Even so, the early Cold 
War deference of Congress to administrations on regulating nuclear matters ended with the 
fracturing of consensus in the Vietnam War.14 Thereafter Congress became much more active 
in constraining the antiballistic missile program of the Nixon administration, the B-1 bomber 
and MX missile programs, Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and ballistic missile 
                                                          
11 Quoted in Wills, ibid., pp. 3-4. 
12 Daniel Ellsberg, The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner (New 
York: Bloomsbury, 2017). 
13 Kenneth B. Moss, Undeclared War and the Future of US Foreign Policy (Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), p. 153. 
14 James M. Lindsay, Congress and Nuclear Weapons (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1991). 
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defense programs. Congress also exercised its treaty power, refusing to ratify the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999 but approving New START in 2010. It used 
authorizing and funding powers under Bill Clinton to terminate funding for low-yield “mini-
nukes,” Safeguard C (a program to conduct atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons), and 
construction of a Ground Wave Emergency Network of communication relay stations. 
Congress also refused to fund research on a “Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator” during the 
George W. Bush administration. Nonetheless, Congress consistently refrained from formally 
asserting control over the decision-making process on nuclear war.  
Even opponents of the existing system typically concur that presidents are within their 
Article II constitutional authority to respond to attacks on the US without prior congressional 
authorization, including nuclear retaliation.15 The focus of the discussion for reform of launch 
authority is therefore, to employ Peter Feaver’s distinction, not situations where “the military 
wakes up the president” but where “the president wakes up the military”16: offensive war. 
Does restrictive legislation therefore infringe the president’s Article II Commander-in-Chief 
authority? And is there a distinction between defensive and offensive nuclear war that 
parallels conventional wars, precluding prior restrictions on retaliation but permitting those 
on anticipatory defence? 
Consensus here is elusive. While Congress possesses undeniable authority to regulate 
the acquisition, quantity and types of weapons available to the president as Commander-in-
Chief, its authority to delimit the weapons then to be used is much more problematic. If 
Congress decides not to fund the purchase or research of certain weapons – as it has 
periodically done with low-yield nuclear devices – this is entirely within its constitutional 
authority. But to direct the president in terms of his choice of existing weapons is not clearly 
within the legislature’s remit. (Equally, an administration that did declare a no-first-use 
policy could not be compelled to order such use by Congress.) Such legislative restrictions 
would appear to infringe Article II: “[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into 
the actual Service of the United States.” But others contend that, under Article I, Section 
VIII, Congress has complete power over the military and the president’s command authority 
operates only where Congress has not provided specific direction.17 Congress can therefore 
prohibit use of nuclear arms absent prior legislative permission and impose rules governing 
the circumstances wherein nuclear weapons are permissibly used.  
History provides some guidance here. The 1787 convention changed the draft power 
of Congress from “make” to “declare” war, drawing a distinction between legislative 
(initiation and general rules) and executive (directive command of operations) functions. 
Initiating war is formally for Congress but making war – including decisions on the means 
for its conduct – remains an executive function. Implicitly, by funding those nuclear weapons 
in the US arsenal and not restricting presidential autonomy on nuclear decisions, Congress 
has conceded that nuclear arms are another war-waging instrument. Can Congress therefore 
                                                          
15 Louis Fisher is a notable exception. 
16 Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, November 14, 2017. 
17 Saikrishna B. Prakash, Imperial from the Beginning: The Constitution of the Original 
Executive (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015). 
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direct how the President exercises command by requiring or prohibiting certain military 
actions involving nukes?  
Congress has authority to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land 
and naval Forces.” Nothing requires these rules to coincide with presidential preferences, 
though presidents can use their veto power to resist them. The power to declare war includes 
the power to establish wartime goals and limit a war’s scope.18 Enumeration of specific 
military powers, however, does not imply that Congress has plenary directive authority over 
operations. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress possessed plenary powers of 
“making rules for the government and regulation of the said land and naval forces, and of 
directing their operations [emphasis added].” Yet in 1787 the Framers deliberately omitted 
the latter clause whilst retaining the former in Article I Section VIII. This strongly implies 
that the power to “direct (military) operations” is the president’s alone. Since Congress 
possesses only specific powers, military matters not within these are necessarily the exclusive 
province of the Commander-in-Chief and, of these, the most prominent is “directing 
operations.” 
If so, in purely constitutional terms, the defensive versus offensive nuclear war 
division represents something of a distinction without a difference. While Congress could 
claim “no-first-use” means the military has not been “called into the actual service” of the 
US, and hence presidential operational autonomy is not encroached upon, this is problematic. 
All administrations have rejected a declaratory “no first-use” policy, because of the strategic 
role of first-use in deterrence as part of an escalation ladder. In this regard, legislative 
restrictions could infringe the directive authority of a president in a potential conflict, even if 
this was non-nuclear in character, by denying him full operational control of the US arsenal:  
Although it seems well within Congress’s constitutional authority to end the 
production of nuclear weapons through, for example, the power of the purse, there is 
no clear answer on whether legislation limiting the President’s power to employ those 
nuclear weapons that are already in the military arsenal would violate separation of 
powers principles.19  
Hard cases invariably make for bad law. Reform proponents typically emphasize that 
the Cold War context is over, while modern communications technology and the limited 
likelihood of first-use scenarios together allow greater time for deliberation. But this neglects 
two related elements. First, geo-political tensions are re-creating multiple limited war 
scenarios, accentuated by AI, cyber capabilities and the comparable power of some 
conventional weapons to nuclear ones. Second, the animating problem with restricting 
presidential decision-making in offensive war is not primarily timing (as would be the case 
with retaliatory launches) but legitimate authority and the strategic consequences of deadlock 
or dissent for the credibility of deterrence threats or military actions. As such, the debate must 
turn heavily on the policy merits of competing options.  
                                                          
18 Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the US Constitution (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002) 2nd edn., p. 76. 
19 Stephen P. Mulligan, “Legislation Limiting the President’s Power to Use Nuclear 
Weapons: Separation of Powers Implications,” Congressional Research Service 
Memorandum, November 3, 2017. 
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Prohibition: No First Use Legislation 
In 2016, Democratic lawmakers asked the Obama administration to adopt a pledge never to 
use nuclear weapons first against a nuclear-armed adversary.20 The utility of such a blanket 
prohibition arguably lies in its strategic clarity. Other nuclear states, such as India, have 
publicly made no-first-use declarations. Supporters claim that such statements affirm that 
nuclear weapons are defensive, not tools of aggression, and thereby help to decrease 
international tensions and assist efforts towards non-proliferation.21 Some have also argued 
that first-use would not conform to the Law of Armed Conflict in terms of legality and 
proportionality. Legislative prohibition – which would require supermajorities to overcome a 
veto - would preclude the president from legally ordering the use of nuclear weapons in 
anything other than retaliation for an attack on the US (and in the case of the Markey-Lieu 
bill, only a nuclear, not a non-nuclear attack that might involve cyber, chemical or biological 
weapons). Presidents would be required, under Article II, to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed” by adhering to its provisions: 
a blanket prohibition on the first use of nuclear weapons is constitutionally 
unobjectionable. Although the prohibition does affect the commander in chief’s 
ability to engage in military activities by refusing to grant him plenary power over a 
particular weapon system, it does not invade the President’s constitutional prerogative 
to conduct war within the confines of the military apparatus created by Congress.22 
Even if one accepts that a blanket prohibition would be legal and constitutional, 
however, there are strong reasons for rejection. Positive public relations aside, in strategic 
terms, whether no-first-use declarations have substantive as well as symbolic utility can 
reasonably be doubted: “Much more wisdom comes from watching what countries do than 
from listening to what their leaders say, since the latter is often primarily designed for 
domestic audiences.”23 There seems minimal reason for optimism that the destructive 
quantity and quality of nuclear weapons will be on anything other than an upward trajectory. 
The number of nuclear states is relatively stable, but this may change if more states acquire 
nuclear capability, not least if North Korea continues to dissemble on denuclearization and 
Iran resumes its nuclear program. The growing popularity of nuclear energy enables several 
states to retain this option. The possible contingencies in which first-use is a necessary option 
for Washington is hence likely to grow rather than diminish. Rather than future-proofing the 
US through outright bans, strategic prudence surely demands that the government possess 
maximum flexibility.  
Beyond this, US and NATO strategic doctrine has rested on the first-use option, 
originally to counter the Soviet Union’s conventional superiority, latterly to address the 
                                                          
20 Letter from Honorable Barbara Lee, et al. to President Barack Obama (October 13, 2016), 
http://lee.creative.house.gov/download/letter-to-president-obama-on-nuclear-no-first-use-
policy.. 
21 Cynthia Lazaroff, “Dawn of a New Armageddon,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists August 6, 
2018, https://thebulletin.org/2018/08/dawn-of-a-new-armageddon/, accessed August 8, 2018. 
22 Allan Ides, “Congressional Authority to Regulate the Use of Nuclear Weapons,” in Raven-
Hansen, ibid., pp. 82-83. 
23 Christopher J. Fettweis, Psychology of a Superpower: Security and Dominance in U.S. 
Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), p. 57. 
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potential threats of Russia to Europe, and China and North Korea to East Asia. Maintaining a 
first-use option has a dual purpose, to deter adversaries and reassure allies. Although a 
selective proliferation scenario might eventually see Washington encourage some allies to 
acquire their own nuclear deterrents, this remains distant.24 Abandoning the first-use option 
would erode deterrence and disturb allies, potentially contributing to the proliferation that no-
first-use proponents claim to oppose.  
Partly for this reason, the Obama administration rejected pleas to adopt such a 
declaration. A close reading of its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review suggested that the 
administration reserved the right to use nuclear weapons against even NPT member states 
that were “not in compliance” with their treaty obligations. That an avowedly abolitionist 
administration should reject no first-use is especially instructive. No consensus exists for 
taking first-use off the table. Moreover, Russian military doctrine now treats the use of 
tactical nuclear weapons to “escalate to de-escalate” as the norm. As Moscow and Beijing 
modernize their nuclear arsenals and adapt their doctrines, the Nuclear Posture Review of 
2017 called for the US also to again examine the utility of low-yield weapons in tailored 
deterrence. In a fluid post-MAD environment, a sound strategic response would seem to 
demand an agile US flexibility to deal with the multiple contingencies of a multi-polar 
nuclear world, not excessive restrictions. 
 
Conditionality: Legislative Authorization 
Following the Obama administration’s rejection, Trump’s presidency encouraged no-first-use 
advocates to advance a legislative strategy as the second-best option for opponents of 
offensive war. To supporters, the restrictive legislation balances strategic necessity – 
eschewing a blanket ban – with constitutional propriety, offering a necessary and timely 
injection of legislative control to the decision-making process. Proponents claims that it 
would subject the ultimate power to the checks and balances that otherwise exist on 
presidents, while leaving undisturbed the retaliatory capacity of the president to respond to 
actual or imminent attacks. 
 Unfortunately, the suggestion replicates all the problems associated with conventional 
war authorizations while adding much greater risk. In constitutional terms, the legislation 
sponsored in the 115th Congress was triply problematic.  
First, it would not allow the president to respond with a second strike to a non-nuclear 
attack on the US, however devastating. Even a formal declaration of war – last made in 1942 
- would be insufficient to allow the Commander-in-Chief discretion to use nuclear weapons, 
since this required a specific authorization even in a declaration.  
Second, such restrictions would again raise important questions regarding the 
legislature’s infringing the operational command of the president. To offer a concrete 
example, in the 1991 Gulf War, James Baker delivered a clear warning to the Iraqis that 
Washington reserved the right to respond to any use of chemical or biological weapons with a 
                                                          
24 Hal Brands, Dealing With Allies In Decline: Alliance Management and U.S. Strategy in an 
Era of Global Power Shifts (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments, 2017). 
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nuclear response. While analysts disagree over its deterrent effectiveness– and nuclear 
weapons use had been ruled out privately in advance25 – the president would be unable to 
credibly make or execute such a threat without prior, open authorization by Congress. 
Third, whether such a no-first-use law passes constitutional muster is unclear at best. 
On the one hand, invoking Justice Robert Jackson’s influential tripartite formulation, the 
president is constitutionally weakest when he is acting contrary to a law passed by 
Congress.26 On the other, the federal judiciary has a mixed record when it comes to questions 
of presidential power, the separation of powers and foreign affairs, with a particularly long 
history of refusing to adjudicate war powers conflicts. Moreover, in Zivotofsky v Kerry 
(2015), the Supreme Court was quite clear about limits on congressional authority and even 
“liberal” Justices such as Elena Kagan have tended to take a permissive view of executive 
power. As Fisher notes with deep regret, judicial support for independent presidential 
authority has been especially pronounced in “the field of external affairs, including the war 
power, treaty negotiation and termination, the state secrets privilege, the power to recognize 
foreign governments, and the broad area of national security policy.”27  
Whatever the constitutional position, in policy terms the arguments for legislative 
restriction of presidential discretion suffer from important flaws. Most notably, Congress is 
notoriously poor in terms of mobilizing collective action, and the dangers of stasis occurring 
on a matter as grave as nuclear warfare multiply the existing risks. As the multi-year struggle 
to pass a new Authorization for the Use of Military Force to replace the 2001 AUMF 
illustrates with pellucid clarity, the inter-branch imbalance over conventional war reflects a 
failure not of the Constitution but congressional will.28 Not only does partisan polarization 
increasingly constitute a national security problem but the potential for crisis amid legislative 
deadlock – a House that authorizes nuclear war and Senate that refuses to do so, or vice versa 
– is very real. While some argue that the special challenges of nuclear decisions justify giving 
Congress some authority to regulate them, the record of legislative oversight has been 
patchy.29 Congress, according to its own senior staff, is ill-equipped to discharge its existing 
responsibilities.30 Finally, the costs of a divisive, contentious and highly partisan debate to 
US deterrence are potentially devastating. Any rational international adversary would be 
likely to take precipitate action rather than patiently awaiting the outcome of legislative 
deliberation by lawmakers who appear less eager to assume genuine co-responsibility for 
military actions than to transfer risk to chief executives.  
What is additionally problematic for Congress is the WPR, which provides presidents 
with the legal authority to initiate hostilities for ninety days. Contrary to claims about the 
                                                          
25 James A. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace 1989-1992 (New 
York: Perigee, 1995), p. 359. 
26 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v Sawyer 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
27 Fisher, ibid., p. xi. 
28 Sarah Burns, “Debating War Powers: Battles in the Clinton and Obama Administrations,” 
Political Science Quarterly 132 (2) 2017, pp. 203-223. 
29 Fowler, Linda L. (2015). Watchdogs On The Hill: The Decline of Congressional Oversight 
of U.S. Foreign Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). 
30 State of the Congress: Staff Perspectives on Institutional Capacity in the House and Senate 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Management Foundation, 2017). 
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growing willingness of presidents to assert “inherent” constitutional powers to justify an ever 
more expansive role in national security policy, “in our post-Cold War era, even the most 
‘forward-leaning’ examples of presidential assertion generally come in the form of aggressive 
interpretation of statutes rather than of the Constitution itself.”31 The WPR is a case in point. 
It certainly provides no clarification, much less a prohibition, on the weapons to be 
employed. As such, it technically appears to accord the presidency the statutory right to 
legally use even nuclear force without prior congressional approval. Presidents have 
contested and rejected the WPR’s constitutionality – especially Section 2(c)32 - and, mostly, 
disregarded its limitations. In this instance, though, Congress would be hoist with its own 
petard. Presidents could point to the grant of legal authority as clear and unlimited or, as with 
conventional uses of force, declare themselves to have acted “consistent with” if not 
“pursuant to” the WPR. Unless Congress sought to use “negative” power, by enacting a 
statute specifically prohibiting use of nuclear weapons in each conflict, then no-first-use 
legislation would conflict with a prior statutory provision enabling first-use.  
Such legislation resembles a “legislative veto” which, though it survived, was ruled 
unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha (1983).33 As the National War Powers Commission noted, 
“The general view is that if the War Powers Resolution were put to the same test in Chadha, 
Section 5(c) of the Resolution, and perhaps other provisions, would fail.”34 Whether a judicial 
challenge would continue the long tradition of judicial reticence to intervene on a “political 
question” is unclear. Perhaps more pertinent is whether presidents would simply flout its 
provisions and Congress not act to secure executive compliance through new legislation, the 
power of the purse, or impeachment. Politically, as the next section details, nuclear weapons 
use would be potentially less damaging to presidential careers than commonly imagined. 
Congress, in sum, has ample constitutional authority to establish a new legal regime 
regulating launch authority. But whether this regime would be constitutional and effective is 
an altogether more contentious question. Legislative deficiencies augur badly for a positive 
congressional contribution to the decision-making process. Deterrence is unlike trade 
promotion authority, where executive branch negotiations of deals are then subject to a 
congressional up-or-down approval. Deterrence relies on credible threats being implemented. 
Conditionality would undercut the credibility of any administration making threats. 
Partisanship has always influenced the “invitation to struggle” over foreign policy but making 
a political football of the nuclear football seems unwise. Given the “perils” that partisan 
polarization already poses to national security, adding even greater risk by exposing nuclear 
decision-making to polarized politics appears imprudent.35 A greater input is unlikely to 
make Congress a “net provider” of US nuclear security.  
                                                          
31 Andrew Kent and Julian Davis Mortenson, “Executive Power and National Security 
Power,” in Karen Orren and John W. Compton (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to the 
United States Constitution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 283. 
32 This states that a president may exercise his powers as Commander-in-Chief “only 
pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national 
emergency created by an attack upon the United States.” 
33 INS v. Chadha 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
34 National War Powers Commission Report p. 23. 
35 Kenneth A. Schultz, “Perils of Polarization for US Foreign Policy,” The Washington 
Quarterly 40 (4) 2017, pp. 7-28 
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Presidential Unilateralism 
It might be argued that the status quo remains the simplest method of organizing launch 
authority. First, surveying the post-1945 history of the “nuclear taboo,” only the most 
jaundiced observers can contend that presidents were reckless warmongers apt to initiate 
nuclear war on a whim. Second, the presidency is not so much unrestrained and lawless as 
preoccupied by multiple legal constraints: unprecedentedly powerful but also 
unprecedentedly accountable.36 Third, Congress can and does use multiple avenues to 
articulate opposition to “presidential wars” and influence administration calculations.37 But as 
Posner and Vermeule note, the political costs as much as legal constraints facing chief 
executives are crucial.38 Fourth, perhaps the most instructive aspect of recent congressional 
activity on nuclear matters is that policymakers have – for now, at least - rejected substantial 
regulatory change. Restrictive no first-use legislation did not secure co-sponsorship of most 
House or Senate Democrats or even come to a vote in either chamber over 2017-19. Nor, 
following its oversight hearings, did the Senate Foreign Relations Committee undertake 
further legislative action. In the balance of risk and reward between restricting a president 
and emboldening an international adversary, most lawmakers have apparently concluded that 
the cost of reform outweighs the possible benefits. 
But none of this relative inertia should induce complacency. The status quo remains 
deeply problematic. At the Senate hearings in November 2017, responding to a question 
about whether the president could ignore a military lawyer’s advice that a launch order was 
illegal, the answer offered by the former head of US Strategic Command, General Robert 
Kehler – this would present a “very interesting constitutional situation”39– illustrated the 
opacity of what would occur if a president acted irrationally or against the law. The ultimate 
recourse to a president acting illegally but no doubt, in his view, morally and legitimately is 
either removal via the 25th Amendment or impeachment for “high crimes and 
misdemeanors.” Neither offers a reliable check on a “rogue” president or dubious launch 
order. 
Faced with a security crisis of such magnitude that first-use was seriously 
contemplated in the White House, a president may not feel fatally constrained by the absence 
of congressional permission. A future president might well echo George H. W. Bush’s claim 
that, “I didn't have to get permission from some old goat in the United States Congress to 
kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait”40 If the primary purpose of legal constraints is to raise 
                                                          
36 Jack Goldsmith, Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11 (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2012). 
37 William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, While Dangers Gather: congressional checks on 
presidential war powers (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Douglas L. 
Kriner, After The Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010). 
38 Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian 
Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
39 Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, November 14, 2017. 
40 President George H.W. Bush, remarks at the Texas State Republican Convention, Dallas, 
Texas, June 20, 1992 at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21125.  
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the political price paid for their violation, this is improbable - but possible. The handful of 
nations against which it is currently possible to imagine such a strike occurring – North 
Korea, Iran, Russia, China, Pakistan - invariably register low in “thermometer” ratings of 
American affections.41 The use of nuclear weapons against a hostile power would also likely 
occur after a campaign by the White House to frame the reasons for action. Shocking though 
the end of non-use might be, it would probably not come as a total shock. Moreover, there is 
no guarantee that even illegal use might forfeit public support. Replaying the 1945 example 
of a Truman-esque trade-off between using nuclear weapons on an enemy and causing mass 
civilian deaths or losing substantial numbers of US troops in a conventional war, Sagan and 
Valentino – applying the trade-off to a hypothetical case involving Iran - found most 
Americans preferring the nuclear option and disregarding the non-combatant immunity norm: 
“Contrary to the nuclear taboo thesis, a majority of Americans are willing to support the use 
of a nuclear weapon against an Iranian city killing 100,000 civilians.”42  
 Under such conditions, the prospect of the Cabinet recommending, and Congress 
supporting, removal is remote, and presidents could plausibly relegate the prospect of 
impeachment to a second or third-order concern (assuming the president and the US survive). 
In today’s febrile partisan environment, especially, it seems highly unlikely that a crisis 
measure taken in good faith by the Commander-in-Chief would meet with universal public 
disapproval. The president’s failure to fulfil his oath “to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed” would not automatically result in impeachment - an abuse of power in violation of 
the nation’s best interests. Politically, it would also be unlikely that a party could easily 
secure both a majority in the House for articles of impeachment and a two-thirds 
supermajority in the Senate to convict. In short, checks and balances are not locks and bolts. 
Presidents using nuclear weapons in a first-strike capacity may have little to fear politically 
for the consequences even of illegal and unconstitutional actions. (The greater concern over 
impeachment could conceivably stem not from excess zeal about military action but, as 
Kennedy feared during October 1962, excess caution.)  
 Although states can “learn” from their experience with nuclear weapons, moderating 
behaviour over time, even long-standing nuclear powers remain exposed to the vagaries and 
vicissitudes of their individual leaders.43 Leaders with direct military experience are less 
likely to authorize the use of military force than those with military but no combat 
experience.44 A more discriminating US (s)electorate might conceivably take notice of that. 
But maintaining the status quo leaves the nation subject to a single individual’s preferences. 
However responsible presidents have been thus far, that exposure is impossible to reconcile 
with the manifest intent and design of the US Constitution and the wider political culture. 
                                                          
41 Jim Norman, “Four Nations Top U.S. Greatest Enemies’ List,” Gallup February 22, 2016, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/189503/four-nations-top-greatest-enemy-
list.aspx?g_source=greatest+enemies&g_medium=search&g_campaign=tiles  
42 Scott D. Sagan and Benjamin A. Valentino, “Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran: What 
Americans Really Think About Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Non-Combatants,” 
International Security 42 (1) 2017, pp. 41-79 at 79. 
43 Michael D. Cohen, When Proliferation Causes Peace: The Psychology of Nuclear Crisis 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017). 
44 Michael C. Horowitz and Allan C. Stam, “How Prior Military Experience Influences the 
Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders,” International Organization 68 (3) 2014, pp. 527-59. 
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Concurrence: Intra-Executive Concurrence 
The most modest but serious alternative is to mandate co-authorization within the executive 
branch. This avoids the multiple problems involving legislative co-decision while ensuring 
that the president cannot order the illegal use of nuclear weapons. While the decision to order 
a launch would remain the president’s, by requiring the concurrence of the Defense Secretary 
and Attorney General, an element of co-responsibility is introduced.45 The former would 
confirm the order’s validity, as originating from the Commander-in-Chief, and the latter 
would confirm its legality. This reform could be achieved either by executive order or 
through a new law passed by Congress.  
 It is mildly ironic that concern about unwise or inappropriate use of the nuclear 
arsenal has evolved from errant generals making unauthorized launches during the Cold War 
– the mainstay of Dr Strangelove and Fail Safe - to impetuous or careless presidents in the 
post-Cold War era.46 But sharing responsibility for the terrible decision to use nuclear 
weapons may even appeal to presidents who otherwise bear the awesome responsibility 
entirely alone. Concurrence offers a double security in offering political and legal cover to 
presidents for their decision while protecting the uniformed military from having to make 
legal calls about a presidential order. In that regard, it offers meaningful protections against 
insufficient deliberation and military insubordination while preserving the key strategic 
benefits of presidential command and control.  
The proposal is, nonetheless, not without its own problems.  
In constitutional terms, only the president possesses authority to act as Commander-
in-Chief. He cannot delegate authority to others, whether within the executive or – as some 
recommended in the 1980s – to a special committee of senior members of Congress. 
Although presidents have delegated authority down the military command, this is distinct 
from civilian control. Requiring the president to obtain concurrence before launching a 
military strike could be seen as unconstitutionally undermining the Commander-in-Chief role 
at the apex of the US military. Moreover, such a law could be viewed as intruding upon the 
president’s authority to “speak for the Nation with one voice” on foreign relations. Against 
this, however, the Defense Secretary here is envisaged as authenticating the source of the 
order rather than “approving” it, and the Attorney General as affirming its legality – neither 
are exercising co-decisional authority as such. Their concurrence may even confirm a 
presidential decision as authentic and legal that both nonetheless view as unwise. 
In operational terms, to the extent that the most likely decisions involving offensive 
use of weapons are likely to comprise limited wars, these may also be precisely the kinds of 
cases where the potential for intra-branch disagreement is greatest. In terms of costs, though, 
introducing a minor delay in the launch decision for such an offensive nuclear war seems 
unproblematic. Necessary secrecy would still be maintained, unlike the option of going to 
Congress. Technology also means that it should be straightforward to communicate with the 
two officials, whatever their location. This would not seem to give the enemy an advantage in 
                                                          
45 Richard K. Betts and Matthew C. Waxman, “The President and the Bomb,” Foreign 
Affairs. 97 (2) 2018, pp. 119-28. 
46 Jeffrey Lewis, The 2020 Commission Report on the North Koran Attacks Against the 
United States (London: WH Allen, 2018). 
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a tense stand-off or during a conventional conflict that threatened to go nuclear. Perhaps only 
in cases of pre-emption, where an anticipatory launch was deemed necessary to avoid an 
imminent attack on the US, might time be of the essence.  
Perhaps the most serious objection to concurrence is that, politically, the proposal 
raises the possibility of deadlock between executive branch officials, with the accompanying 
risk of either a strategic cost or political crisis. That is, in a nascent or on-going national 
security crisis – presumably the only situation in which nuclear force is contemplated – the 
president faces the options of either backing down from his desired decision or firing the 
recalcitrant officials. In the latter, since the Defense Secretary and Attorney General require 
Senate confirmation, a national – if not a constitutional - crisis could arise. As the memoirs of 
multiple senior officials attest, internecine mistrust and suspicion between and within the 
staffs of executive branch agencies and departments is a matter of the extent, not the fact.  
Again, though, while this objection has merit, it is not dispositive. Concurrence is 
designed precisely to raise the possibility of placing “insubordination on firmer legal 
footing.”47 This applies to civilian and military opposition alike. Suppose the Attorney 
General refused to confirm the legality of the launch order. Either the president would then be 
required to reverse his decision and refuse to take an action that he determined was in the 
national interest or he would be required to dismiss the official. In October 1973, President 
Nixon ordered the Attorney General, Elliott Richardson, to fire Special Watergate prosecutor 
Archibald Cox, but both Richardson and his deputy, William Ruckelshaus, refused and 
resigned. Cox was then fired by Solicitor General Robert Bork in what became known as the 
“Saturday Night Massacre.” While Nixon won in the short-term, the crisis irreparably 
weakened his presidency. The potential costs to timely action and US credibility could be 
serious in a pending nuclear strike. But that would be the point. A political massacre would 
be infinitely preferable to a nuclear one. The prospect of the former would be designed to 
dissuade a president from taking injudicious actions that would precipitate the latter in all but 
the most extreme instances. 
Such a system of concurrent authorization would not satisfy those who argue for the 
involvement of Congress. Nor could it be more than a necessary but insufficient safeguard on 
an irresponsible or stubborn president. A determined president might simply rescind an 
executive order mandating concurrence or ignore a law that is deemed unconstitutional, 
betting on favorable political odds to survive impeachment or removal. Concurrence might 
also encourage presidents to appoint personally loyal figures – hacks, relatives and so on, 
rather than distinguished individuals - to the relevant offices. In short, the reform might be 
reduced to mere window-dressing in which the “triumvirate” can be expected to ratify an 
irrational but – in the Attorney General’s view - legal decision. Where the involvement of 
Congress poses serious potential problems in hindering a timely, clear and independent 
decision-making process, on this reading the concurrence model offers the worst of both 
worlds: risking political crisis while not seriously restraining presidential autonomy. Against 
this, it demands that Congress take its responsibilities seriously – not in assuming executive 
functions for which it is ill-suited but in scrutinizing nominees to the posts of Defense 
Secretary and Attorney General with due diligence. 
                                                          
47 Betts and Waxman, ibid., p. 127. 
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Conclusion 
The absence of reliable checks and balances on the president’s nuclear launch authority is a 
function of the unique properties of nuclear weapons and the continuing necessity of 
“calculated ambiguity” to effective deterrence. Compromising presidential decision-making 
authority over nuclear weapons remains sub-optimal while such weapons exist. Rather than 
gambling on national security, Washington could make incremental but serious steps to 
shoring up US nuclear architecture: eliminating “use or lose” silo-based missiles, taking 
nuclear ICBMs off high-alert status, and improving command-and-control to increase 
warning and launch times. A re-dedication to resolving the geo-political conditions that 
underlie the emerging nuclear order would also assist but unilateral disarmament in the face 
of serious nuclear threats is senseless.48 
In the context of declining public trust in all major institutions bar the military, it may 
seem quixotic to maintain such vast power in the presidency. But there exist no easy 
institutional “fixes” to the dilemma of command and control, contrary to those who either 
lionize the presidency and discern no problem or who fetishize legalism and place their trust 
in an inconstant and irresponsible Congress. Requiring congressional authorization is 
constitutionally problematic and likely to seriously diminish the effectiveness of US nuclear 
deterrence to adversaries and reassurance to allies. And while there is a mechanism for the 
exercise of democratic accountability - the quadrennial presidential election – this offers only 
limited purchase to decision-making. Requiring concurrence within the executive branch for 
initiating nuclear launches is a modest but serious improvement on the existing unsatisfactory 
system. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists’ “Doomsday Clock” ticked thirty seconds on, to 
two minutes to midnight, after January 2018. The hour for reform of nuclear launch authority 
has also now arrived. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
48 Brad Roberts, The Case for US Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2016). 
 16 
 
   Author Biography 
 
Robert S. Singh is Professor of Politics at Birkbeck, University of London. His research 
encompasses contemporary US politics and foreign policy. The most recent of his eleven 
books was In Defense of the United States Constitution (New York: Routledge, 2018). 
